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Abstract
Dialetheists concerning the paradoxes of self-refrence have often ar-
gued that the phenomeonon provides a choice between inconsistency
and expressive incompleteness, and that inconsistency is the correct
choice. In a recent paper (Beall (2015)), JC Beall attacks this argu-
ment. This paper analyses his arguments, and argues that his paper
simply provides a new spin on matters well known.
1 Introduction
Dialetheists about the semantic paradoxes of self-reference have often argued
that one can have consistency or expressive completeness, but not both;
and that inconsistency is better than incompleteness (since natural language
obviously can express the notions in question). In ‘Trivialising Sentences and
the Promise of Semantic Completeness’,1 JC Beall criticises this argument.
He mounts an argument to the effect that one can have triviality or expressive
completeness, but not both. Here, he argues, expressive incompleteness is
the obviously correct choice. Moreover, he claims, since this argument is
exactly parallel to the dialetheist argument, it should be treated in the same
way. Hence, in the dialetheic case, we ought to accept incompleteness too.
The point of this note is to comment on this argument.2
1Beall (2015). Page references are to this unless otherwise stated
2Many thanks go to Beall for a helpful correspondence, which clarified a number of
matters in his paper, and to a referee of this journal for helpful comments.
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2 Curry Paradoxes
The argument for the dialetheic conclusion is essentially the Liar paradox.
This hardly needs an explanation here. So let us move to its supposed ana-
logue, which Beall dubs the trivialiser paradox. To understand what is going
on in this, it is important to put it in context. This is Curry’s paradox. Let
us start by recalling some facts about this.
The first version of Curry’s paradox was produced by Curry (1942), and
goes essentially as follows. We construct a sentence, C, of the form C → ⊥
(where ⊥ is a logical constant entailing everything). We also assume the
principle of Absorption: A → (A → B) ` A → B, which contracts two
occurrences of an antecedent into one. The argument now goes as follows:
C → C
C → (C → ⊥)
C → ⊥
C
⊥
The third line is delivered by Absorption. The other lines are self-explanatory.
In (1979) Meyer, Routley, and Dunn produced a variation of Curry’s
paradox which uses, not Absorption, but Pseudo Modus Ponens (PMP):
(A ∧ (A→ B))→ B. The argument goes as follows:
(C ∧ (C → ⊥))→ ⊥
(C ∧ C)→ ⊥
C → ⊥
C
⊥
The third line obviously assumes some simple properties of conjunction. The
rest of the argument is straightforward.
Though the argument looks rather different from the original Curry ver-
sion, it is not really. The reason is that, in conjunction with some other
natural principles, PMP is equivalent to Absorption. The proof in one direc-
tion is as follows:
(A ∧ (A→ B))→ B
So if A→ (A ∧ (A→ B)) then A→ B
But A→ A
So if A→ (A→ B) then A→ (A ∧ (A→ B))
So if A→ (A→ B) then A→ B
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The proof in the other direction is as follows:
((A→ B) ∧ A)→ A
So (A→ B)→ ((A→ B) ∧ A)→ B)
But ((A→ B) ∧ A)→ (A→ B)
So ((A→ B) ∧ A)→ (((A→ B) ∧ A)→ B)
So ((A→ B) ∧ A)→ B
The last line is given by Absorption. Note that if we do not have this, we
have only: ((A→ B) ∧ A)→ (((A→ B) ∧ A)→ B).
3 Validity Curry
In (2013), Beall and Murzi came up with a version of Curry’s paradox, which
uses, not the conditional, but a validity predicate, V al(x, y), which satisfies
two rules. The first is V1:
A
...
B
V al(〈A〉 , 〈B〉)
where angle brackets indicate naming, overlining indicates the discharge of
an assumption, and there are no other assumptions in the sub-deduction.3
The second rule is V2:
A V al(〈A〉 , 〈B〉)
B
Note that these are almost exactly the same as the rules of →-introduction
and→-elimination. That they should give rise to a paradox of the same kind
as the original Curry argument is hardly, therefore, surprising.
We now construct a sentence, C, of the form V al(〈C〉 , 〈⊥〉), and the
3For Beall, deducibility, and so Val, are relative to a theory, T . This means that the
deduction here may employ members of T taken as discharged assumptions—or simply
proofs thereof, if T is an axiomatic theory.
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argument goes essentially as follows:
C ` C
C ` V al(〈C〉 , 〈⊥〉)
C ` C
C,C ` ⊥
C ` ⊥
V al(〈C〉 , 〈⊥〉)
C
⊥
The fourth line follows from the second and third by an application of V2;
the sixth follows from V1. The rest is self-explanatory.
As a casual comparison will show, there is a clear structural similarity
between this argument and the original version of Curry’s Paradox. The
contraction of conditional antecedents has just been turned into a contraction
of assumptions.
Now, Beall’s current paradox goes as follows. A is a trivialiser iff A ` ⊥;
and a trivialiser predicate is a predicate, Triv(x), that says that something is
a trivialiser. We can, in fact, define Triv using Val, as follows: V al(x, 〈⊥〉).
He now assumes the following:
(*) A ∧ V al(〈A〉 , 〈⊥〉) ` ⊥
Where C is as before, we then argue as follows:
C ∧ V al(〈C〉 , 〈⊥〉) ` ⊥
C ∧ C ` ⊥
C ` ⊥
V al(〈C〉 , 〈⊥〉)
C
⊥
As a casual comparison will show, there is a clear structural similarity be-
tween this and the Meyer/Routley/Dunn version of Curry’s Paradox.
As we saw when we discussed this, the use of PMP encodes a contraction
of antecedents. So does (*). There is nothing special about ⊥ in this: (*) is
just a special case of:
(**) A ∧ V al(〈A〉 , 〈B〉) ` B
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Now, rewriting V2 as A, V al(〈A〉 , 〈B〉) ` B, we can see that this delivers (*)
provided that assumptions are allowed to contract, as follows:
A ∧ V al(〈A〉 , 〈B〉) ` A
A ∧ V al(〈A〉 , 〈B〉) ` V al(〈A〉 , 〈B〉)
So A ∧ V al(〈A〉 , 〈B〉), A ∧ V al(〈A〉 , 〈B〉) ` B
A ∧ V al(〈A〉 , 〈B〉) ` B
The third line is delivered by V2. Just as with the Meyer/Routley/Dunn ver-
sion of the Curry argument, without contraction, we have only the principle
with two occurrences of the antecedent/assumption.
In fact, as can now be seen, Beall’s argument is just the Meyer/Routley/Dunn
version of the Validity Curry paradox. We still have the argument to deal
with. But now it is clear that Beall’s claim that the Liar and the Trivialiser
are of the same kind is just the claim that the Liar and Curry’s paradox are
of the same kind. This is certainly a vexed question. But it is not a new
one.4
4 The “Chief Challenge”
In the last section of his paper, somewhat in tension with the stated aim of
the paper, Beall says (p. 581, his italics):
The question—and the chief challenge of this paper—is to give a
simple and plausible account of why the natural and highly plau-
sible narrow-adequacy condition [GP: i.e., (*)] should be rejected.
As we have seen, what is at issue here is precisely contraction, and what is
being asked for is a justification of the failure of this. Premise-contraction is
perfectly legitimate provided that assumptions are thought of as forming a
set (or more generally, as Beall assumes, that a theory is a set). So what is
required is a justification for the rejection of this.
In contraction-free substructural logics, such as linear logic and many
relevant logics, one must distinguish between extensional conjunction, ∧,
4Prima facie, the fact that contraction of some kind seems to play a role in all versions
of the Curry Paradox, whilst it appears to play no role in the Liar, would seem to set
them apart. But everything in this area is contentious. See, e.g., Weber, Ripley, Priest,
Hyde, and Colyvan, (2014), Beall (2014), and Priest (201+), Section 15.
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and fusion, ◦. When one does so, one does not have (A ∧ (A → B)) → B.
However, one does have ((A→ B) ◦ A)→ B. (Arguably, it is the confusion
of ∧ and ◦ that motivates those who endorse PMP; and similarly, for the
confusion of A∧V al(〈A〉 , 〈⊥〉) ` ⊥ with A◦V al(〈A〉 , 〈⊥〉) ` ⊥ .) In setting
up a sequent calculus for such a logic, it is natural to deploy two ways of
combining premises, ⊕ and ⊗—corresponding to ∧ and ◦, respectively.5 As
is to be expected, we do not then have A ⊕ (A → B) ` B, but we have
(A→ B)⊗ A ` B.
Given this machinery, premises of an inference do not form a set; they
form what is sometimes called a bunch, that is, a formula obtained by inter-
ating operations of ⊕ and ⊗. We may, if we wish, then specify a theory by
specifying a set of axioms, but this has to be understood as meaning that
we are entitled to any bunch formed from those axioms. At any rate, this
provides the justification Beall requests.6
Of course, one might challenge the whole machinery of sub-structural
logics, and insist on an independent justification for that. There is, of course,
an enormous literture on substructural logics, a good part of it directed to
questions of justification.7 Here is not the place to go into this. It suffices to
say that substructural logicians are well aware of Beall’s challenge. So there
is nothing really new in this matter either.
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